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Short-range missiles pose a significant threat to U.S. strike fighters. These 
missiles are usually small and highly mobile. These types of missiles can be carried on 
light vehicles and by individual people. Although these missiles do not have a long range, 
the unpredictability of their launch sites increases their lethality (Bartak 2005, 6–7). Also 
contributing to their lethality are the methods of homing on their targets. Most are passive 
methods, such as infrared. Unlike active radar homing, these missiles provide no warning 
to the aircraft that it is being tracked until the missile has been launched. The varieties of 
homing methods for these missiles can also provide problems for aircraft countermeasure 
systems. Each type of homing method requires a different type of countermeasure. All 
current airborne countermeasure systems rely on “soft-kill” methods of protection 
involving confusion or distraction of the homing system. These systems work differently 
for different homing methods and must be constantly upgraded to protect against ever 
more complex targeting systems (Ball 2003, 335–358). 
This report is a technical and operational feasibility analysis for a “hard-kill” 
Advanced Airborne Defensive Laser (AADL) system to destroy or physically disable 
incoming missiles. This system uses a high-energy laser either to destroy an incoming 
missile or to cause enough physical damage to prevent the missile from intercepting its 
target. The AADL will be an external pod mounted on a strike fighter and will be almost 
entirely autonomous. The system will detect missile launch, track targets, and eliminate 
them. It will use built-in systems for power generation, target tracking, and laser 
transmission. 
The concept of operations (CONOPS) of the system begins with detecting missile 
launch. The system detects the missile and automatically begins tracking it and plotting a 
firing solution. Simultaneously, the mission computer of the AADL uses the host 
aircraft’s communication systems to alert the pilot and friendly forces to the threat. Once 
a firing solution has been determined and the laser transmitter moved into position, the 
incoming missile is fired upon and neutralized. This action is taken without input from 
the pilot as any delay from human reaction time can cause disaster. After the threat is 
 xvi 
neutralized, the pilot and friendly forces are once again notified. If there are further 
incoming missiles, the highest priority threat is targeted and engaged. A set of 
requirements describing the actions necessitated by the CONOPS in further detail was 
also developed. Due to the nature of the early stage of development for this system, these 
requirements are notional and subject to change based on future analysis. 
Based on these requirements, a functional architecture was created. This 
architecture breaks those requirements down into a hierarchy of functions and allows, in 
combination with the physical architecture, creation of an allocated architecture. This 
physical architecture is a generalized relationship of components based on research into 
existing systems analogous to the subsystems of the AADL. Following this, an allocated 
architecture was developed, showing that every function is accomplished by a 
component. These functions can then be traced back to requirements. 
Research was then conducted into currently existing technology that could be 
used to develop design alternatives for the AADL. These alternatives consisted of 
technology for the power supply, laser transmission, and targeting subsystems. These 
specific subsystems were analyzed because these were the main subsystems whose 
functions could not be accomplished by technology commonly used by the U.S. military. 
These technologies were analyzed for cost, effect on flight performance, technology risk, 
and functional performance. Because of the immature nature of many of these 
technologies, the cost could not always be established with a firm dollar amount. Where 
that information was not available, information on construction materials and methods 
was used to provide a comparative cost between alternatives. Effect on flight 
performance was established by comparing the weights and speed limits of the 
alternatives. Technology risk was based on the Technology Risk Level standards 
established by the Department of Defense. Finally, the functional performance was 
assessed through the use of computer simulations. These simulations use a program made 
by Imagine That Inc. named ExtendSim to model the positions and velocities of the 
aircraft and incoming missiles. This information was then passed to a physics-based high-
energy laser modelling program called HELEEOS to determine the amount of time 
 xvii 
needed to neutralize the missile. The total time to neutralize all incoming missiles was 
compared between the alternatives to calculate the functional performance metric. 
Based on this analysis, it was determined that the best configuration based on 
technologies currently available uses the ram air turbine of the Next Generation Jammer 
(named HiRAT) for airborne power generation and lithium-ion batteries for power 
storage. For laser transmission, the optimal technology is the Ytterbium fiber laser. 
Finally, the Distributed Aperture System, used by the F-35, was determined to be the best 
alternative for the tracking system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern conflicts have changed the threat profile facing military aircraft. Most 
engagements in the last 20 years have been against non-state actors rather than against 
countries. Military aircraft now face threats from highly mobile, short-range surface-to-
air missiles more often than from aircraft or long-range stationary air defense systems. 
These are generally man- or light vehicle-portable missiles and can be launched from 
almost anywhere. In addition, these missile threats generally use passive guidance 
systems, such as infrared (IR). Unlike radar, these passive systems give no indication to 
the pilot that their aircraft has been targeted. These types of systems are widely available 
to many of the non-state actors faced by the militaries of the world today. Although 
countermeasures such as chaff, flares, and jammers are employed on aircraft, increasingly 
sophisticated seekers continue to limit their effectiveness (Bartak 2005, 6–7). A 
countermeasure that could execute a hard-kill on any type of missile could offer 
comprehensive protection from current and future threats. This hard-kill countermeasure 
is the Advanced Airborne Defensive Laser (AADL), also known as the Cyclops pod. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The F/A-18 multi-mission strike fighter suffers from a vulnerability if it comes 
under attack from short-range missiles. A defensive system capable of detecting and 
disabling incoming missiles would increase the aircraft's probability of surviving. The 
primary function of this system is to physically disable the incoming missile by 
weakening the structure or destroying the seeker head so that pursuit is no longer 
possible. In addition, because infrared-based tracking systems use light to home in on 
their targets, a laser strike on these types of seeker heads can “blind” them without 
destroying them and functionally disable these threats. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The goal of this report is to provide a baseline for future development of the 
Cyclops pod. This is done through the development of a system architecture as well as a 
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feasibility analysis. This shows the system’s concept of operations, shows its technical 
feasibility, and provides a framework for future development of this system. 
C. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The systems engineering (SE) process used for this report will be the Three-Phase 
approach shown in Figure 1. This process was developed by John M. Green for modeling 
a ship as a weapon system. The first phase was to establish the report’s requirements as 
well as to evaluate the current capabilities of existing equipment in both the commercial 
and defense industry. The second phase focused on research and model development to 
determine the possible configurations of the system. Finally, the third phase of the report 
used modeling and simulation, as well as other analytical tools to qualitatively and 
quantitatively evaluate the AADL for incorporation with the F/A-18. The various phases 
and sub-phases of this process are discussed below. 
 
Figure 1. Three-Phase Systems Engineering Plan. Adapted from Bechtel (2011). 
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1. Problem Definition 
The first phase of the SE process used in this report was the Problem Definition 
phase. This stage involved three main sub-phases: researching existing capabilities, 
identification of stakeholders, and defining the project constraints, limitations, and 
boundaries. Each of these sub-phases were executed simultaneously and are discussed 
below. The outputs of this phase of the SE process were a problem statement for the 
report, the report requirements, and scenarios used for the evaluation phase. 
a. Existing Capabilities 
The existing capabilities of the current technologies were researched and analyzed 
during this phase of the report. This sub-phase was used to identify if any similar reports 
have been completed or attempted to prevent duplicate research and effort. This sub-
phase is covered in Chapter II. 
b. Stakeholder Identification/Analysis 
The stakeholders of the report were identified and analyzed to help develop the 
report throughout the entire SE process. It was important to identify stakeholders early in 
the SE process as their input ensures the created system will be appropriate for its 
intended utilization. Stakeholder analysis helps prioritize stakeholder input and ensures 
the proper constraints are placed on the report. Because stakeholder input was used 
throughout the SE process, early and accurate identification and analysis of the various 
stakeholders was critical in successful system creation. This sub-phase is covered in 
Chapter II. 
c. Scope and Deliverables 
This sub-phase of the report is devoted to laying out the end items of the report as 
well as documenting what will not be covered in this report. This sub-phase is related to 
the Objectives section, which describes the intent of the report. It is also related to the 
Limitations and Constraints section, which describes limitations associated with the 
CONOPS and analysis. This sub-phase is covered in Chapter I. 
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2. Design of Alternatives 
The second phase of the SE process is the Design of Alternatives phase. This 
phase consists of three sub-phases: Research, Model Development, and Operations 
Development, which were conducted concurrently and described further below. 
a. Technology Research 
The purpose of the research from the Problem Definition phase was to understand 
current technology capabilities and limitations. Unlike the Existing Technologies sub-
phase, this is an examination of technologies at a more detailed level. Where that portion 
focused more on entire systems, this sub-phase focuses more on the technology at a 
component level. This sub-phase was developed in support of several sections and so 
does not have a section specifically devoted to it. This sub-phase is covered in  
Chapter III. 
b. Architecture Development 
This sub-phase is devoted to the development of the physical and functional 
architecture. The intent of this section is to clearly and thoroughly lay out what the 
system will be doing and what components will allow it to do so which will then be used 
in developing the Evaluation of Alternatives. This sub-phase is covered in Chapter III. 
c. Concept of Operations Development 
The operations development of the report was an important process that defined 
how the final product will be used. These scenarios were important for the model 
development and system validation and critical during the analysis of alternatives. This 
sub-phase is covered in Chapter II. 
3. Evaluation of Alternatives 
The final phase of this SE process is to evaluate the possible solutions and provide 
recommendations. The sub-phases within this SE phase are to simulate and analyze 
engagements, as well as to score and compare the alternatives.  The primary output of 
this phase was the final recommended solution. 
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a. Simulate and Analyze Engagement 
The previously developed models were used to simulate and analyze engagements 
of the various solutions within the chosen scenarios. The results of these simulations were 
analyzed to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and tradeoffs of each solution. The 
results were evaluated against the original constraints, cost, and performance goals of the 
report, developed initially in the first SE phase. This sub-phase is covered in Chapter IV. 
b. Scoring and Analysis of Alternatives 
Each alternate solution was appropriately scored and evaluated to determine the 
optimal solution. An appropriate set of system metrics was selected and used throughout 
this phase to ensure the best solution is properly identified. Metrics and analysis methods 
were identified prior to this phase to eliminate possible evaluation bias. This sub-phase is 
covered in Chapter IV. 
D. SCOPE AND DELIVERABLES 
This report contains a system architecture and technical/operational feasibility 
analysis assessing design considerations for creating the most effective system to reduce 
F/A-18 susceptibility to short-range missiles. Areas considered are: 
• concept of operations 
• performance requirements for incoming missile neutralization 
• AADL system architecture 
• aircraft integration requirements 
• potential aircraft modification requirements  
• subcomponent technical requirements 
• analysis of suitability of existing and near-future technologies 
• future research recommendations  
• additional design considerations  
• solution recommendation 
 6 
Because an integrated, hard-kill missile defense system on an aircraft is largely 
unprecedented, this report focuses primarily on the design principles for effectiveness, 
with only minor consideration given to logistics, support, test & evaluation, and life cycle 
maintenance. 
E. REPORT ROADMAP 
Chapter II defines and explains the system’s high-level and functional 
requirements. In addition, detailed CONOPS are laid out for several different scenarios 
involving an aircraft coming under fire. 
Chapter III covers the development of the system architecture. This section 
outlines the interactions of the system, both internal and external. This chapter also ties 
the requirements outlined in Chapter II to the functional architecture laid out in this 
chapter. 
Chapter IV builds on the technical analysis in the previous chapter and covers the 
analysis of alternatives. Chapter IV also includes a description of the scoring standards 
used, a list of the configurations to be tested, their scoring, and an assessment of 
technology risks. 
Chapter V contains a summary of the report as well as the report’s findings and 
recommendations with regards to technical/operational feasibility. 
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II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The requirements and CONOPS act as both the foundation and the framework for 
any project. They are driven by an analysis of the stakeholders in the project, their needs, 
and each other. The CONOPS needs to form a functional plan to meet stakeholder needs, 
and the requirements needed to ensure a system is delivered that is capable of executing 
that CONOPS.  These will provide the foundation from which the architecture builds and 
a framework for the development of the simulation models used for scoring of 
alternatives. 
The uniqueness of the concept behind this system means the CONOPS and 
requirements are unlike most systems. The CONOPS for this system is based largely on 
existing anti-missile systems such as Phalanx close-in weapons system (CIWS), Tactical 
High Energy Laser (THEL), and Iron Dome. These systems use 20 mm rounds, chemical 
lasers, or missiles to destroy incoming rockets and missiles. While all of these provide the 
same type of protection as the Cyclops, none of them include carriage on a strike fighter 
as part of their CONOPS. Existing hard-kill missile systems are large, heavy, and (in 
some cases) fairly delicate. 
A. EXISTING CAPABILITIES 
There is a limited amount of previous research on the utilization of a high energy 
laser on an aircraft as a countermeasure. Therefore, this section focuses on the three main 
hardware subsystems of the Advanced Airborne Defensive Laser (AADL). These are the 
laser transmission system, the tracking system, and the power supply system. The 
significant performance requirements and state-of-the-art technology required from these 
subsystems identified these as the best candidates for investigation in this report. 
1. Laser Transmission System 
The use of high energy lasers (HEL) for missile defense is not a new concept for 
the Department of Defense (DOD). As far back as 1984, plans were being developed with 
the Strategic Defense Initiative to mount powerful lasers on satellites to shoot down 
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incoming ballistic missiles. Although these plans never came to fruition, later 
development in the 1990s would yield better results. In 1996, the U.S. military developed 
the THEL. This ground-based system and its mobile variant are used to destroy incoming 
surface to surface indirect fire weapons such as rockets, mortars, and artillery (Northrop 
Grumman 2017e). Although this system proved its ability to neutralize incoming threats, 
its size and logistical footprint made it a poor fit for the modern battlefield. In 2002, the 
Air Force made its first flight with the YAL-1, a Boeing 747 modified with a large 
chemical laser designed to neutralize airborne ballistic missiles. However, the relatively 
close ranges needed for large missiles and the high cost led to the cancellation of the 
program (Nogee 2014). 
In 1999, Northrop Grumman developed the Directional Infrared Countermeasure 
System (DIRCM). This system provides a firing solution for a weak, onboard laser to 
confuse the incoming missile’s seeker sensor and programming. The DIRCM system was 
not designed for fast-moving aircraft, and numerous challenges arise when trying to adapt 
a comparable system for use with a strike fighter. This system is also the basis for the 
Northrop Grumman Guardian system, which is designed to provide an anti-missile 
capability to commercial aircraft (Pike 2011b). 
2. Target Tracking System 
Bomb and missile technology has greatly improved from inception to today. With 
the increase in these technologies’ sophistication, there has also been an increase in 
missile tracking systems and, subsequently, missile defense tracking systems. Since the 
beginning of missile threats, there have been missile defense programs in almost all 
shapes and sizes on land, water, and air. This report focuses on air defense, particularly in 
the form of an externally mounted HEL system that will be carried by a strike fighter and 
defend against surface-to-air missile systems by destroying incoming missiles before they 
can threaten the aircraft. Current laser missile defense systems, such as DIRCM and 
Large Aircraft Infrared Counter Measures (LAIRCM), are mounted on slower moving 
and larger aircraft. These work by jamming IR sensors on the head of the missile. These 
systems have their own missile tracking and warning capabilities that integrate with the 
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laser system. The jammer is either an open-loop system, which confuses missiles with IR 
energy or a closed-loop system, which will send a specific jam code to cause the missile 
to break lock. The most common of these systems is Northrop Grumman’s AN/AAQ-
24(V) NEMESIS (Pike 2011a). This type of system leaves the pilot out of the kill chain 
and notifies him of what took place. This automation is critical when fractions of a 
second could be the difference between life and death. Unfortunately, there have been 
problems trying to integrate these same missile warning systems in tactical fast movers; 
too many false alarms arise. The tracking system can falsely identify IR energy as a 
target, and this effect is multiplied when integrating with tactical aircraft. Subsequently, 
tactical aircraft have continued to rely on maneuvers and older missile defense systems 
such as flares because these are the only reliable means of neutralizing missile threats. 
The missile tracking for F/A-18s is even more difficult as radar systems will warn pilots 
of incoming threats, but tracking is left up to the pilots and co-pilots.   
3. Power Supply System 
HELs are currently being investigated as a significant strategic capability with 
potential end application use on naval air platforms. However, HEL systems require high 
electrical power inputs, increasing the need for research in this area. High electrical 
requirements make external power generation a must on certain air vehicles such as the 
F/A-18. The use of ram air turbines (RATs) and lithium-ion batteries within a pod is a 
viable option that has been developed by the Navy with Next Generation Jammer 
(Warwick 2013).  
The RAT designed for the Next Generation Jammer could be used for other 
applications. The high-power RAT developed by Advance Technologies Group Inc. 
(ATGI) has the potential to generate up to 700 kW.  There has also been research on 
creating RATs that vary in size depending on power need. However, using a RAT is air 
vehicle speed dependent, and the use of a secondary power source may be required as 
well (Warwick 2013).  
A second source of high power can be provided by lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries. 
The Navy is currently developing more advanced Li-ion batteries through NAVAIR 
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Science and Technology Program projects with the goal of implementation of Li-ion 
batteries on aircraft. The F-35 currently has a high voltage lithium battery for backup 
power. Lithium batteries have high energy density increasing the output power with 
reduced size (McHale 2014). 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Table 1 lists the stakeholders whose interests align with the goals of the AADL 
project. The requirements and CONOPS are largely built off of inputs from 
representatives of the F/A-18 combat survivability and naval aviation platform 
integration communities. Although this project is intended to be usable on multiple 
aircraft, certain requirements are based on the F/A-18. This aircraft was chosen as the 
best driver for certain requirements because it is responsible for executing missions like 
all strike fighters but also must be capable of withstanding takeoff and landing on a 
carrier. 
 
Table 1. Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Description 
PMA-265 The AADL system will reduce a vulnerability 
faced by the F/A-18, and its requirements are 
partially based on specifics from this aircraft. 
U.S. Naval 
Aviation 
Although focused more on the F/A-18, this 
project has applications for the F-35 and other 
future aircraft as well. 
Department of 
Defense 
As with the F-35, this project could also be 
extended to Air Force or even Army aviation 
aircraft. 
 
C. HIGH-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS 
The system-level requirements are composed of four different categories: 
First, the functional attributes of the store to aircraft system must be sufficient to 
allow for proper communication and electrical interfaces between the two systems. This 
 11 
requirement will define the type of information communicated to the aircraft from the 
pod as well as ensure that the correct military standards are followed. 
Second, there are requirements for the laser subsystem performance. These 
requirements will ensure that performance of the laser is sufficient to defeat incoming 
missiles before they can damage the host aircraft. 
Third, the power subsystem requirements for the Cyclops must be sufficient for 
the operational usage of the system without impacting the power requirements of the 
aircraft. These power requirements must be completed meeting the necessary standards to 
ensure safety and compatibility. 
Finally, the tracking and detection subsystem on the Cyclops must be capable of 
tracking and targeting the appropriate amount of missiles reliably. It must also be capable 
of differentiating between friendlies and hostiles as well as appropriately prioritizing the 
targets to ensure maximum energy efficiency. 
The above paragraphs give insight into the derivation of the system-level Cyclops 
system level requirements provided in Table 2 and discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 2. High-Level Requirements 
Number High-Level Requirements 
0 System shall protect the aircraft from incoming missile 
threats 
1 System shall communicate with friendly forces 
2 System shall defeat incoming missile before damaging the 
aircraft 
3 System shall be capable of powering all systems 
simultaneously 
4 System shall track and target incoming missiles 
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D. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
The above system-level requirements of the Cyclops provide the core structure 
from which functional requirements can be developed in order to support various 
CONOPS. The following functional requirements have been derived from these system-
level requirements and traceability is shown in numbering. 
The power subsystem of the Cyclops must be able to provide all power needs to 
the other subsystems. Power requirements are based on laser and tracking and detection 
needs. The laser system has high power requirements for a few seconds (to produce 
pulsing power) to destroy a missile threat. Because the threat cannot always be known in 
advance, the power subsystem should be able to have enough power stored to eliminate 
the threat in the appropriate amount of time. 
While the electric subsystem is tasked with providing power to destroy the threat, 
the Cyclops tracking subsystem must be able to detect, track, and target threats while not 
interfering with the aircrew normal mission operations. In order for this to be possible, 
the system will need to defend against the myriad of man-portable air defense systems 
(MANPADS) and other anti-aircraft missile systems. Table 3 shows the ranges in 
characteristics of the MANPAD threats faced by military aircraft today (Military Factory 
2015; Bartak 2005, 3). 
 
Table 3. MANPADS Threat Characteristics 
Missile Series Top Speed Maximum Range 
9K34 Strela-3 415 m/s (1367 ft/s) 4.1 km (2.5 mi) 
9K38 Igla 570 m/s (1870 ft/s) 5.2 km (3.2 mi) 
FIM-92 Stinger 800 m/s (2625 ft/s) 4.8 km (3 mi) 
 
Because multiple threats can be fired at once, the tracking and detection 
subsystem must to be able to queue up multiple threats and prioritize which is the 
greatest. This range of threats drives the functional requirements of the tracking system. 
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Finally, the laser subsystem must be considered. While the implementation details 
are left to a contractor, research suggests a threshold of 10 kJ delivered to the incoming 
missile is needed to ensure destruction. This value will, therefore, be used for proof of 
concept calculations, modeling, and power estimates (Nielsen 2009). 
Time for neutralization of an incoming threat is designed to defeat threats 
comparable to those listed in Table 3. The maximum time required for the Cyclops pod to 
destroy a missile is three seconds. This requirement is based off of the capabilities of the 
currently used DIRCM system (Northrop Grumman 2017d). This requirement also drives 
the engagement range requirement. It is possible that multiple missiles will be fired at an 
aircraft during the course of an engagement. To account for the need to destroy at least 
three missiles in flight before they intercept the aircraft, the engagement range 
requirement is 4.5 miles. This requirement is derived from the distance that the highest 
speed missile in Table 3 can cover in three seconds (the neutralization time requirement). 
This distance is approximately 1.5 miles. To account for the possibility of multiple 
missiles in flight, an engagement of three incoming threats is assumed for this 
requirement. In order to defeat three missiles in flight, Cyclops will need to be able to 
engage them at 4.5 miles. 
Short-range missiles are most likely to engage an aircraft from below. However, 
the exact angle is arbitrary and based upon the speeds of the missile and aircraft, as well 
as their starting positions relative to each other. To account for this unknown, the laser 
must be capable of engaging a missile within at least a 90° arc below the aircraft. This is 
based off of the capabilities of the DIRCM system (Willers 2012). In additional, coverage 
arcs above and on each side of the aircraft would provide increased protection. The laser 
must also have safeguards to prevent the beam from causing damage to the aircraft. 
Requirements for the Cyclops system were built in concert with the functional 
hierarchy shown in Figure 2. A more detailed set of requirements are listed in Appendix 
A. All requirements are based on unclassified data. All requirements are notional and 
subject to change based on future analysis. 
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Figure 2. Functional Hierarchy Chart 
E. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
All analyses in this report assume a clear day with no precipitation. Support 
requirements are also assumed to be essentially equal across alternatives. When modeling 
system performance against threats, information regarding designs and capabilities 
specific to individual models of missiles is not used. Instead, generalized values are used 
for parameters such as missile range, speed, and construction. 
It is assumed that this system will be usable on different types of aircraft. 
However, certain requirements are based on the F/A-18. This is due to its high 
acceleration on takeoff and landing as well as its short takeoff requirements putting 
significant constraints on system weight and durability. It is further assumed that certain 
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not required to perform beyond the capabilities of currently existing technology 
employed by the military. As such, this report does not focus on them.  
The main constraint faced with this report is performance information. Much of 
the technology in the three main subsystems is immature, so the best data available is 
from controlled tests or design specifications. Due to the lack of data, performance under 
battle conditions is simulated. Analysis of the logistical requirements for this system will 
be minimal. Unfortunately, trying to make estimates of support requirements by analogy 
would be impossible because no system like this has ever been fielded. When analyzing 
alternatives, support requirements are assumed to be equal. 
Another constraint faced is sensitivity of the information associated with combat 
aircraft survivability. Including classified information in this report would significantly 
complicate its writing and limit the audience authorized to read it. Because it is difficult 
to specifically assess and compare aircraft survivability against different threats without 
delving into classified information, system effects on survivability will not be quantified. 
Instead, the scoring of alternatives focuses on performance in combat simulations. 
F. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
Today’s aircraft require a countermeasure system that can accurately identify, 
prioritize, and direct strikes on incoming missiles while simultaneously communicating 
with host aircraft the position, status, direction and velocity of these threats. For example, 
during Desert Storm, six USAF A-10s are believed to have been brought down by 
infrared (IR) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). These threats are still in existence today, 
such as MANPADs (Ball 2003). 
1. Scenario 1 – Single Missile Fired at Host Aircraft 
This single threat scenario is likely to be one of the most common the Cyclops 
pod encounters.  In this circumstance, the aircraft has flown into enemy airspace and 
comes under fire from a single short-range IR homing SAM.  The Cyclops shall be 
capable of protecting the aircraft from both hit-to-kill warheads and high explosive 
warheads with proximity fuses. The pod, mounted on the aircraft, detects missile launch. 
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The Cyclops will then begin tracking the flight path of the missile and developing a firing 
solution to efficiently neutralize the threat. Simultaneously, the pod alerts the pilot to the 
situation both audibly and visually. It also alerts friendly forces in the area, such as 
aircraft and Naval vessels to the threat.  At this point, the pilot maintains a course with 
limited maneuverability to allow the pod the highest probability of intercepting the 
missile.  The Cyclops then uses its beacon illuminating laser to reflect energy from the 
missile that provides data about the rapidly changing nature of the atmosphere along the 
sightline of the target.  The battle management system uses this data to track and aim the 
laser at the threat. Once the laser is in position to fire, it will automatically do so without 
requiring input from the pilot. Depending on the properties of the incoming missile, the 
laser will either alter the missile’s aerodynamics enough to prevent it reaching its target 
or outright destroy the missile. Once the laser has begun firing on the target, it will be 
neutralized before damaging the aircraft. The system will alert the pilot when the threat 
has been neutralized.  In the event that the missile cannot be neutralized with a high 
probability, the Cyclops will alert the pilot to begin evasive maneuvers while it continues 
to attempt neutralization of the threat. This engagement scenario is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Single Missile Fired at Host Aircraft 
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2. Scenario 2 – Multiple Missiles Fired at Host Aircraft 
The Cyclops will decrease the susceptibility of the strike aircraft in the event of an 
attack from the operationally realistic threat of multiple short-range IR homing SAMs. 
Cyclops will detect the launch of multiple threats. The tracking system will then analyze 
the flight path of the incoming missiles to determine which missiles are on track to 
impact the aircraft. Those that are not a threat are disregarded. The system can track 
multiple incoming missiles at one time. If more missiles are detected to be homing on the 
aircraft than the system can defeat with high probability, the pod will alert the pilot that it 
will not be able to neutralize the threat and advise the pilot to take evasive action. If eight 
or fewer missiles are determined to be threats, the pilot will maintain, to the extent 
possible, a steady, stable course to increase the laser’s probability of kill by reducing 
jitter in the beam. Incoming missiles are then prioritized based on their proximity to the 
aircraft, with the closest target considered the highest threat. After that threat is 
neutralized, the next closest missile is targeted. The pilot is alerted to these actions but 
has no input in this process. This procedure is carried out until no further threats are 
airborne or, significantly, a threat is determined to have a low likelihood of neutralization 
before impact. The pod will then advise the pilot to take evasive maneuvers while it 
works to neutralize the threat. As with the previous scenario, once the laser has begun 
firing, the target will be neutralized within three seconds. This engagement scenario is 
shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Multiple Missiles Fired at Host Aircraft 
3. Scenario 3 – Single Missile Fired at Allied Aircraft 
The Cyclops will also be capable of providing area defense against short-range 
missile threats.  When flying on a mission with other aircraft, the Cyclops will fire on any 
incoming missiles without trying to determine whether or not it has maintained target 
lock on a friendly aircraft. When missile launch is detected by the pod, it will proceed to 
simultaneously track the missile and alert all friendly forces in the area. If a friendly 
aircraft without a Cyclops pod is targeted, it will begin evasive maneuvers to try to break 
missile lock. The Cyclops will then develop an optimal firing solution and fire on the 
missile. As with the previous scenarios, this process requires no input from the pilot and 
threat neutralization take no longer than three seconds. The pod will not coordinate with 
other Cyclops pods on wingmen or threat missile defense assets. It will provide 
information on incoming threat and alert friendly forces to the situation, but it is not 
intended to be used for broadcasting detailed information. This engagement scenario is 
shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Single Missile Fired at Allied Aircraft 
4. Scenario 4 – Multiple Missiles, Allied Target(s) 
The most complex scenario for the Cyclops pod will occur when one aircraft 
loaded with the pod performs a mission with multiple aircraft and more than one of these 
aircraft come under attack from short-range missiles. The pod detects the launch of 
several missiles and alerts friendly forces in the area. It then proceeds to track the 
missiles in flight to determine which are homing in on the host aircraft. If more than eight 
are incoming on that aircraft, it will advise the pilot to take evasive maneuvers. If eight or 
fewer missiles are targeting the host aircraft, it will maintain limited maneuverability 
flight while other friendly aircraft in the area begin evasive maneuvers. Threat 
prioritization will then begin targeting the nearest missiles first. In most cases, this will 
result in missiles targeting the host aircraft taking priority over those targeted at others. 
The Cyclops pod will continue eliminating, reprioritizing, and firing on targets until no 
further airborne threats exist. As with the previous scenarios, this process will not require 
any input from the pilot, and the laser will take no longer than three seconds to neutralize 
each missile. This engagement scenario is shown in Figure 6. 
 20 
 
Figure 6. Multiple Missiles, Allied Target(s) 
This area of denial role against short-range missiles will pair particularly well 
with the EA-18G Growler. A comprehensive anti-missile defense net can be created by 
combining the longer range jamming and anti-radar capabilities of the Growler with the 
short-range missile protection provided by the Cyclops pod. Using these two systems in 
concert as an escort for a strike package can provide the level of protection necessary for 
executing deep strikes into fortified enemy territory. This engagement scenario is shown 
in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Multi-Layer Missile Defense 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided both a background for and an overview of how the AADL 
will solve the vulnerability laid out in the problem statement. It focused on how the 
system will interact with the environment. These include interactions with incoming 
threats, the host aircraft, and friendly forces. 
The following chapter will build off of this overview to translate the requirements 
and CONOPS into a detailed system architecture. The chapter will lay out the functions 
carried out in the CONOPS in detail. It will also describe the physical components of the 
pod as well as their interactions and the functions they support.  
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III. ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
While the functional requirements and architecture can be established at a detailed 
level, it is significantly more difficult to reach a similar level of detail for the physical 
architecture. The unprecedented nature of this project and its requirements mean that 
there are very few existing systems on which to base the architectures. Because of this, 
several aspects of the physical characteristics will be kept to a higher, less detailed level. 
In addition, physical architectures for only the laser transmission, tracking, and power 
supply subsystems have been created. Although there are other subsystems such as the 
onboard computer or cooling system, the requirements of these components are already 
satisfied by technology currently in use and thus, are not closely examined in this report. 
Initially, the functional architecture was developed based on the functional 
requirements discussed in Chapter II. From this functional architecture, research was 
conducted into prospective technologies that could be used in the design of the Cyclops 
pod. The physical architecture was developed from this research. Due to the relatively 
unprecedented nature of this system, the physical architecture is built by examining the 
requirements and determining what physical systems will be necessary to satisfy them. 
This process is in contrast to other projects, where existing systems can create an 
architecture “baseline” from which the physical and allocated architectures can be built. 
The physical architecture characteristics laid out in this chapter are based on research into 
cutting-edge and near-future technology specific to the individual subsystems. 
A. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
There are four main functions that the pod must perform, which were first 
identified through the high-level requirements discussed in Chapter II. These four 
functions are: 
1. Communicate with Friendly Forces 
2. Provide Power to the Pod 
3. Track Incoming Threats 
4. Engage Incoming Missiles 
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All of these functions performed together will meet the primary requirement to 
protect the aircraft from incoming threats. Figure 8 shows the “IDEF0” Functional 
Architecture for the Cyclops pod, which demonstrates the flow of inputs and outputs 
through the system. Each of these functions is further decomposed into functions. These 
functions and their decomposition are discussed in detail below. 
 
Figure 8. Cyclops IDEF0 
 
1.0 Communicate with Friendly Forces 
This function describes the communication between the Cyclops pod and the host 
aircraft, as well as the information that will be communicated to other friendly forces that 
are not carrying the pod. The inputs to this system are the power status, the power 
generated, and missile location/identity. These inputs provide the necessary power and 
information required by the host aircraft and, as appropriate, other friendly forces. The 
outputs from this function are the alerts and messages that are sent to the host aircraft and 
the friendly forces. All of this is achieved using the onboard mission computer within the 
pod system. It is controlled by the system statuses passed to it by the subsystems and the 
connectivity to the aircraft. 
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A decomposition of this function depicted graphically in the figures below, shows 
its functional architecture. These functions can be further decomposed until they fulfill 
the lowest level functional requirements. These decomposed functions will use controls, 
mechanisms, and inputs similar to Communicate with Friendly Forces.  
Figure 9 shows the first decomposition of Communicate with Friendly Forces. 
This functional architecture consists of two functions, which identify all communication 
that will be performed between the carrying aircraft and, thus, friendly aircraft, and the 
pod. 
1.1 Communicate to the Aircraft Information Concerning Incoming 
 Threats 
First, the pod must be capable of communicating information about the incoming 
threats which clearly relates to the primary mission to protect the host aircraft as the 
threats must be identified and tracked prior to engagement. Furthermore, when this 
information has been relayed to the host aircraft, the aircraft’s communication system 
will be responsible for sending information to other friendly forces. This information will 
not flow directly from the pod to friendly forces.  
1.2 Communicate Status of Cyclops Systems 
Second, the pod must be able to communicate the status of its various systems. 
This function will ensure that the status of the pod is properly communicated so the 
pilot(s) may act accordingly if there are any potential performance issues with the pod. 
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Figure 9. Communicate with Friendly Forces Decomposition 
Communicate to the Aircraft Information Concerning Incoming Threats can be 
further decomposed. The first level of decomposition possesses one function. The second 
level of decomposition is shown in Figure 10. 
1.1.1 Alert Pilot to Missile Threats 
This function specifically involves alerting the host aircraft pilot to the incoming 
missile threats. A decomposition of this function reveals the numerous actions that this 
function entails. The flow between these functions can be seen in Figure 10. Each 
function will take an input of the power from the power system and the missile threat 
information. Each function will then output the appropriate message/alert about the 
threat. 
1.1.1.1 Send Threat Data to Ground Control 
First, the pod must be capable of sending the threat data to ground control via the 
host aircraft. This is a critical function for superior operational performance of the pod. 




1.1.1.2 Alert Pilot when Missile Threats are Defeated 
Second, it is important for the host pilot to know when the missile threats have 
been defeated. If the threat is not defeated, the pilot will need to take evasive action. 
Alerting the pilot that a threat is defeated will allow the pilot’s attention and energy to 
focus on the mission and not on the existence of a potential threat.  
1.1.1.3 Pass Defeated Missile Data to Aircraft Mission Computer 
Third, the pod must be able to pass the defeated missile data to the aircraft 
mission computer. The aircraft may use the information of the incoming threats to 
determine system actions, such as communication to other friendly aircraft. It is 
important that the system transmit the status of the defeated missile.  
1.1.1.4 Validate True Threats to Reduce False Alarms 
To ensure only the relevant information is passed to a pilot, the system must be 
capable of identifying true threats. For example, the system may correctly identify a 
missile launch, but choose not to communicate this threat as the trajectory of the 
incoming missile is not a threat. 
1.1.1.5 Alert Pilot to Low Likelihood of Defeating Incoming Missiles 
If the system detects that a missile threat is unlikely to be defeated before 
damaging the host aircraft, the system will alert the pilot to begin taking additional steps 
to avoid missile impact. This could be due to the system’s inability to effectively engage 
a target or due to an excessive amount of threats incoming on the target.  
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Figure 10. Alert Pilot to Missile Threats Decomposition 
Communicate Status of Cyclops Systems can also be decomposed into two lower 
level functions fulfilling the requirements identified in Chapter II. The flow of attributes 
can be seen in Figure 11.  
1.2.1 Communicate with All Systems within the Pod 
The Cyclops pod contains several systems working together to perform the high-
level functions. The status of these systems must be communicated within the pod so the 
overall status can be appropriately assessed and then communicated to the host aircraft. 
This status is passed from this function to Communicate Pod Status to Aircraft. 
1.2.2 Communicate Pod Status to Aircraft 
The Cyclops pod contains several systems working together to perform the high-
level functions. It is important that Cyclops be able to communicate to the host aircraft 
the status of the various pod systems so the pilot can make the proper decision on how to 
proceed with the mission. This function will receive the status from Communicate with 
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All Systems within the Pod and output the appropriate alert or message to the host 
aircraft.  
 
Figure 11. Communicate Status of Cyclops Systems Decomposition 
2.0 Engage Incoming Missiles 
This function describes the actions of the pod’s laser system. It takes power from 
the power system and the threat priority as inputs and outputs the status of the threat 
missile to be used by external systems. This function is controlled by the missile being 
within range, the firing solution, and the threat priority  
Figure 12 shows the first decomposition of the parent function. This functional 
architecture consists of three functions, which identify all the functions performed by the 
laser system.  
2.1 Align Laser Transmitter with Firing Solution 
This function refers to the laser aligning itself to the firing solution plotted out by 
the tracking system. The tracking system uses the missile location and velocity data to 
determine the optimum line of fire for incapacitating the target. This function takes that 
firing solution as input and moves the laser transmitter such that the system can project a 
beam along this solution.  
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2.2 Engage missiles around the platform 
The laser needs to engage the missiles around the platform and incapacitate them 
before they damage the aircraft. This will include the ability to engage the missiles within 
the arc necessary to protect the aircraft.   
2.3 Monitor Laser System Status 
Finally, the system needs to be able to diagnose any malfunctions with the laser 
system. These malfunctions could range from power system failure to a calibration error. 
These status reports are then passed to the mission computer and relayed to the host 
aircraft.  
 








3.0 Provide Power to the Pod 
This function describes the actions of the pod’s power system. There are no inputs 
to this function. However, the output (generated power) is an input for all other functions 
of the pod, highlighting its importance to the overall system. The system will also output 
the supply status, which is used by Communicate with Friendly Forces. This function is 
controlled by the aircraft being in the air, as the power supply is dependent upon the 
aircraft being in the air and in motion. Finally, this function will use the onboard 
computer and existing power supply.  
A decomposition of this function depicted graphically in the figures below, shows 
its functional architecture. These functions can be further decomposed until they fulfill 
the lowest level functional requirements. These decomposed functions will use controls, 
mechanisms, and inputs similar to Provide Power to the Pod.  
Figure 13 shows the first decomposition of the parent function. This functional 
architecture consists of three functions, which identify all the functions performed by the 
power system.  
3.1 Provide Electrical Power to Pod while Flying 
This function identifies the primary purpose of the power system, which is that 
power must be supplied to the various systems within the pod throughout the flight. This 
is the only function of this system that will be further decomposed. This function outputs 
power to be used throughout the Cyclops pod.  
3.2 Monitor Power Supply Status 
Finally, the power supply status must be monitored so the system can verify that 
the pod possesses enough available power to perform the desired tasks. The output from 
this function, the power system status, is an input into Communicate with Friendly 
Forces.   
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Figure 13. Provide Power to the Pod Decomposition 
The decomposition of Provide Electrical Power to Pod while Flying is shown in 
Figure 14. This decomposition consists of four functions, fulfilling the requirements 
identified in Chapter II.  
3.1.1 Generate Electrical Power 
First, the power system needs to generate enough electrical power to supply all systems 
within the pod. This function provides raw electrical power to Convert Electrical Power.  
3.1.2 Convert Electrical Power 
The pod power system must convert the generated electrical power into the 
appropriate type of power required for each system within the pod. This function will use 
the power passed by Generate Electrical Power and convert it to usable power to be 
passed to the other functions within this decomposition.  
3.1.3 Store Electrical Power 
Third, since not all power will be used immediately after generation, the pod must 
possess a method to store a sufficient amount of power to meet the needs of other system 
functions. This usable power from Convert Electrical Power will be converted to the 
stored power passed to Distribute Electrical Power.  
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3.1.4     Distribute Electrical Power 
Finally, the system must be able to appropriately distribute the electrical power 
throughout the pod as required by each subsystem. This function receives the usable and 
stored electrical power and then distributes it to the rest of the pod. 
Figure 14. Provide Electrical Power to Pod While Flying Decomposition 
4.0 Track Incoming Threats 
This function describes the actions required to track incoming missiles. Before the 
Cyclops pod can execute the system’s main function of defeating an incoming missile, it 
must be able to track and identify the threat. This function receives power from the power 
system as well as incoming missile information from the environment outside of the pod. 
Both the firing solution and threat priority are passed to Engage Incoming Missiles as 
outputs. Another output of the system is the change in missile threat status. The final 
output is the tracking system status to be used by Communicate with Friendly Forces. 
The system is controlled by the missile being within range. 
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A decomposition of this function depicted graphically in the figures below, shows 
its functional architecture. These functions can be further decomposed until they fulfill 
the lowest level functional requirements. These decomposed functions will use controls, 
mechanisms, and inputs similar to Track Incoming Threats.  
Figure 15 shows the first decomposition of the parent function. This functional 
architecture consists of four functions, which identify all the functions performed by the 
tracking system.  
4.1 Detect and Track Incoming Missiles 
The system must be capable of tracking incoming threats. This function will 
identify incoming missiles and then pass the threat count to Prioritize Threat Missiles.  
This function will be limited to the missiles within range and the maneuvering limits of 
the pod, as calculated by the pod’s onboard sensor that determines the ability of the pod 
to engage a threat accurately. 
4.2 Prioritize Threat Missiles 
When there are multiple threats, it is important that the system be able to 
prioritize the threats based on threat level. This function will use the threat count passed 
from Detect and Track Incoming Missiles and will output the missile location and 
identity, to be used by Engage Incoming Missiles and Communicate with Friendly 
Forces.  
4.3 Monitor Tracking System Status 
Finally, the system needs to be able to diagnose any malfunctions with the 
tracking system. These malfunctions could range from power system failure to a 
calibration error. These status reports are then passed to the mission computer and 
relayed to the host aircraft.  
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Figure 15. Track Incoming Threats Decomposition 
The decomposition of Detect and Track Incoming Missiles is shown in Figure 16. 
This decomposition consists of four functions, fulfilling the requirements identified in 
Chapter II. 
4.1.1 Detect Missile Threats 
The tracking system must be able to detect incoming threats. These individual 
threats are inputs for this function, resulting in a threat count as an output to be used by 
Prioritize Threats. 
4.1.2 Track Missile Threats 
The system must be able to track detected threats in flight. It must track airborne 
threats and generate the firing solution to be used by Engage Incoming Missiles. It also 




Figure 16. Detect and Track Incoming Missiles Decomposition 
The decomposition of Prioritize Threats can be seen in Figure 17. This 
decomposition consists of two functions, fulfilling the requirements identified in Chapter 
II. These functions will require a dedicating computer processing unit (CPU) to perform 
the appropriate calculations.  
4.2.1  Identify Highest Threat Missiles 
First, the tracking system must be able to identify the highest priority missiles 
after an incoming missile has been identified. It will then output the threat priority to be 
used by Engage Incoming Missiles and missile location/identity to be used by Engage 
Incoming Missiles and Communicate with Friendly Forces. 
4.2.2  Queue Additional Lower Priority Missiles 
Finally, the ability to identify the highest threat will also require that the other 
lower threats are appropriately queued.  
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Figure 17. Prioritize Threats Decomposition 
B. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
The physical architecture of the system is broken down into three main 
subsystems, each approximately corresponding to a high-level function. These systems 
are the Laser, Power Supply, and Tracking subsystems. These correspond to Engage 
Incoming Missile, Provide Power to the Pod, and Track Incoming Threats respectively. 
The subsystem responsible for Communication with Friendly Forces is the Mission 
Computer located in the pod. This system is responsible for diagnosing malfunctions in 
the pod as well as passing messages and information to the host aircraft systems for 
transmission to friendly forces. This subsystem is not closely examined in this report, as 
mature technologies similar to this are currently in use by the military. 
1. Laser Subsystem 
The laser subsystem is responsible for defeating incoming missiles. It accepts 
inputs from the tracking system for the prioritization and targeting of incoming missiles, 
and then receives power from the generator to generate a laser and respond to the threat. 
The strength and range of the laser is limited by the maximum available power from the 
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generator and the maximum safe output power of the laser. Figure 18 shows the 
breakdown of the laser subsystems. 
 
Figure 18. Laser Subsystem Physical Hierarchy 
The physical architecture of the laser-generating subsystem could have variations 
based on the laser’s source. For instance, a chemical oxygen iodine laser requires sources 
of oxygen and iodine gas to generate the laser beam while a free-electron laser uses a 
series of electromagnets and a solid state laser would employ an optical pump and crystal 
assembly to accomplish the same purpose. The most likely implementation given current 
technologies would be a solid state laser, but any design that meets the mission 
requirements would be acceptable. Ultimately, any proposed laser system will feature a 
laser generator, focusing mirrors, and a targeting lens. It could also have an active 
cooling element. The generator element is responsible for generating the laser beam. The 
focusing mirrors direct the laser into the targeting lens. The lens then aims the beam at 
the target. 
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The most likely implementation, based upon the currently available technologies, 
is a solid state laser. A chemical or free-electron laser would be too large and heavy for 
installation on the aircraft at this time. Because of this, the architecture shown above is 
representative of a solid state laser with optical diode pump. 
2. Power Supply Subsystem 
Figure 19 shows the Power Supply system decomposed in its four top-level 
subsystems. Each unit has also been decomposed into components to fulfill the functions 
shown in the functional architecture. 
 
Figure 19. Power Supply Physical Architecture Decomposition 
The Power Supply subsystems are then decomposed into components; Figure 20 
shows the power generation unit breakdown components. Throughout our research, we 
have found that the use of a ram air turbine (RAT) and an electrical generator is the most 
optimal way to generate power within the pod while the aircraft is flying. The RAT uses 
air to spin the turbine that is connected to the generator shaft producing electrical power. 
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Figure 20. Power Generation Unit Physical Architecture Decomposition 
Figure 21 shows the Power Converter Unit breakdown components. Since the 
laser uses high amounts of power, it was found that two types of conversion were 
necessary: high voltage conversion for the laser high energy requirements and low 
voltage conversion to power all electronics within the pod. The high voltage power 
generated by the Power Generation Unit is rectified and regulated to meet an optimal 
high voltage to be used by the laser; the high DC voltage is also connected to a DC to DC 
converter that will lower the voltage to be used by the pod electronics. 
 
Figure 21. Power Converter Unit Physical Architecture Decomposition 
Figure 22 shows the component breakdown for the Energy Storage Unit.  The 
advantages of using storage devices are significant to this project. These systems can 
provide power at any moment, and high energy devices can provide the required amount 
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of power to eliminate the threat. We found in our research that the use of high energy and 
power density batteries are ideal to meet the pod’s high power requirements. The 
components in the breakdown consist of a battery and a battery charger for high voltage 
for the elimination of threats and lower voltage as backup power in case of generator 
failure.  
 
Figure 22. Energy Storage Unit Physical Architecture Decomposition 
Figure 23 shows the component breakdown for the Power Distribution Panel. The 
use of voltage buses can make the distribution of power through the system very 
efficient.  The buses used would include a high voltage bus for the laser and low voltage 
bus for the pod’s electronic components. 
 
Figure 23. Power Distribution Panel Physical Architecture Decomposition 
3. Tracking Subsystem 
The Physical Architecture of the Tracking System is broken down into the Sensor 
and CPU. The Sensor then breaks down to a UV Sensor, and the CPU breaks down into 
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Threat Assessment Software and the Threat Database. The SV-1 diagram of the Tracking 
and Detection System can be seen in Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24. Tracking System Physical Architecture Decomposition 
The CPU uses a database of known threats to determine the specific identification 
of the missile. The sensors initiate the tracking through detection of missile threats and 
send the data to the CPU for classification. 
C. ALLOCATED ARCHITECTURE 
Table 4 is a matrix displaying the connection between each of the requirements 
and the component that performs it. Some components have been omitted from the matrix 
as their level of decomposition would make their allocation redundant. An example of 
this is the laser generator component which can be decomposed into the crystal assembly, 
optical pump, and focusing mirrors. However, none of these components support 
functions separate from the laser generator. Thus, allocating these components would 
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have been unnecessary. These assets were included in the physical architecture for the 
sake of clarity and thoroughness in this report. 
 
Table 4. Allocated Architecture Matrix 
 
 
Every function is supported by a component of the physical architecture. All of 
the “administrative” functions of the pod, such as malfunction diagnosis and 
communication, are handled by the Mission Computer System. These are all functions 
currently performed by pods in use by the U.S. armed forces, and so the supporting 
technology is not closely examined in this report. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
While Chapter II gives a broad overview of the pod’s behavior and interactions, 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.0 Mission Computer System X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
2.0 Laser System X X X X
2.1 Laser Generator X X X
2.2 Targeting Lens X X X X
3.0 Power Supply X X X X
3.1 Power Generation Unit X
3.2 Power Converter Unit X
3.3 Energy Storage Unit X
3.4 Power Distribution Panel X
4.1 Tracking Sensor X X X X
4.2 Tracking System CPU X X X X
4.2.1 Threat Assessment Software X X X
4.2.2 Threat Database X X X









allow the system to meet the CONOPS. Furthermore, it breaks down the physical systems 
that support those functions. 
Chapter IV will build off of the physical architecture laid out in Chapter III to 
develop a series of alternatives to analyze. These alternatives will be put through a series 
of simulations based on the functional architecture to determine combat performance. 
Finally, these alternatives will be scored based on their performance. These performance 
metrics will be based on the requirements established in Chapter II. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
The requirements established in Chapter II created a foundation on which to base 
the Cyclops pod’s functions. This functional architecture was then used as a framework 
to build a physical architecture. In this chapter, that physical architecture is then used as a 
baseline from which to research and develop a design of alternatives. 
The alternative technologies considered were based on the three main subsystems 
analyzed in this report: the power supply system, the laser transmission system, and the 
tracking system. Once the technologies considered as alternatives were identified, they 
were evaluated using several metrics. These metrics include cost, the effect on flight 
performance, and functional performance.  
A. ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTIONS 
This section is dedicated to the description of characteristics of the alternatives as 
well as the criteria used to identify them as viable technologies. An analysis of the risks 
associated with each of the alternatives is also included in this section. 
1. Laser Subsystem 
The F/A-18 platform has extreme size and weight constraints that limit feasible 
options for laser design. The most common laser types are gas, chemical, and solid state. 
Free-electron lasers are also somewhat common and warrant consideration. Gas lasers 
have short life expectancies, making them poor candidates for use in military equipment 
(Paschotta 2008). Chemical lasers provide the basis for the Tactical High-Energy Laser 
and have a proven track record for defeating incoming threats (Schwartz 2002). 
Unfortunately, chemical lasers are far too large and heavy for installation on an F/A-18. 
Solid state lasers provide a smaller, lighter alternative to chemical lasers. Some solid state 
mediums, such as titanium sapphire, are too inefficient for consideration (Payne 1989), 
but the higher efficiency solid state options can be configured to reach efficiencies of 
20% or more routinely. Among these is the neodymium-doped yttrium aluminum garnet 
(Nd:YAG) laser medium and the ytterbium and erbium fiber lasers. These three laser 
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mediums are further analyzed within this section. Finally, the free-electron laser (FEL) 
provides an alternative to a chemical laser, but weight continues to remain a concern. 
Shipboard FEL designs are over 100,000 lbs. and have lower wall plug efficiency than 
solid state lasers (Mansfield 2005). Therefore, FEL lasers are considered poor 
alternatives at this time. 
Solid state lasers continue to have promising candidates for laser mediums. The 
Nd:YAG laser has an expected wall plug efficiency of 18% and a wavelength of 1064 nm 
(Mansfield 2005), or 30% wall plug efficiency and 532 nm wavelength using frequency 
doubling techniques (Wall 1990). The latter is known as the frequency doubled Nd:YAG 
(FdYAG) laser. While the current limited market for high power weaponized lasers 
makes weight estimates difficult, modeling by Boeing provides a scaling factor for the 
output power to weight of a solid state laser at 172 W/kg when wall plug efficiency is at 
20% (Vetrovec 2002). This results in an expected weight of 1025 lbs. for an 80KW 
Nd:YAG laser. 
Fiber lasers have already been proven effective for shipboard configurations of 
lasers, specifically the Laser Weapon System (LaWS). The LaWS system combines six 
individual fiber lasers into a single high energy beam. The ytterbium fiber laser medium 
provides a heavier, but more energy efficient, alternative to the Nd:YAG laser. The 
ytterbium laser has a wavelength of 1055nm, nearly identical to the Nd:YAG. However, 
fiber lasers have an efficiency of 30% (Hecht 2012). An expected weight can be 
calculated by considering the weight of a 1KW laser and extrapolating for an 80KW 
variant (Sprangle 2008). An estimated 20 lbs. per KW predicts a final weight of 1600 lbs. 
for a fiber laser. 
The erbium fiber laser medium has comparable weight and efficiency to the 
ytterbium laser, but the wavelength, 1550 nm, is nearly 50% larger. All four of these 
alternative configurations, including the standard and frequency, doubled Nd:YAG, will 
be compared via modeling to determine the most appropriate material. 
Risk consideration of the various laser systems is constrained by the limited 
number of real world HEL lasers currently developed by the DOD. The greatest risk is 
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damage to the HEL due to the heat generated while firing. The repeated heating and 
cooling of the system can cause metal fatigue, warping of the targeting and focusing 
lenses, and reduction in beam quality (Vetrovec 2002). These issues could result in 
degraded system performance and ultimately system failure. The expected reduction in 
performance over time, as well as the possibility of a mitigating cooling system, is 
outside of the scope of this project and left for future investigation. A design risk also 
exists due to the cutting edge nature of the proposed system. If the power to weight 
scaling factor for the Nd:YAG laser is inaccurate, the system may be too heavy to be 
installed on the F/A-18. This is of less concern for the fiber lasers, due to their scalable 
nature. 
2. Tracking Subsystem 
While numerous missile tracking and detection systems exist in today’s military, 
not many of them can integrate with the F/A-18 platform due to the excessive numbers of 
false alarms brought on by the operational speeds of the aircraft. The goal of this part of 
the analysis of alternatives is to determine which current missile detection system could 
best support strike fighters’ missions. One assumption that has to be taken into account 
for each assessment is that the system will integrate and function with the Cyclops pod. 
The research of tracking and detection systems on jets has the potential to be a whole new 
capstone project and is not the goal of this paper. Therefore, assumptions about current 
systems had to be made due to time and unclassified information limitations.  Three main 
systems emerged as potential options. 
The AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) system is currently being 
employed on the F-35. This tracking and detection system readily integrates with the 
Threat Nullification Defensive Resource (ThNDR) system. This system provides missile 
detection, tracking, and targeting/cueing capabilities to the F-35 missile defense systems 
and the pilot. The DAS allows for a 360-degree sphere for detection and tracking 
capabilities. The DAS uses a single-color IR sensor that can process images faster than 
existing missile warning systems, which has allowed the DAS to function on fast moving 
jets without creating false alarms. While this system has not seen much operational use, it 
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is currently being used on the F-35, and it has had extensive laboratory testing and has 
proven to track multiple missiles simultaneously (Northrop Grumman 2017b). This 
system was designed specifically for the F-35 and has proven a valuable system on the 
aircraft thus far. Transferring the technology that has been fully integrated with a fast 
moving jet such as the F-35 to the F/A-18 is a very plausible option.  
The risk associated with attempting to integrate the DAS with the Cyclops system 
is that DAS was specifically built for the F-35 platform and to integrate with that 
aircraft’s ThNDr system. This will cause some work for integrating the DAS with the 
Cyclops as it will have a different laser and power system configuration.  
The AN/AAQ-24(V) DIRCM system is a more familiar name as it is installed on 
over 750 aircraft, including large, small, rotary wing, and tilt-rotor aircraft (Northrop 
Grumman 2017a). The DIRCM system simultaneously detects, tracks, and defeats threats 
in cluttered environments. Because the system is installed on over 750 aircraft and has 
been around for over 50 years, it has been battlefield tested. Therefore, technology failure 
risks are low. While the DIRCM system in its current form has proven to be a rather 
robust system, there have been difficulties trying to integrate it with fast-movers, such as 
the F/A-18. One of the initial issues was too many false alarm notifications while moving 
at high speed. In addition, the size of the DIRCM system was too large and the laser not 
powerful enough to defend the aircraft (Aviation Week 2013). While the DIRCM system 
has issues when integrating with fast movers, it has proven itself on many aircraft 
platforms. 
The biggest risk with using the AN/AAQ-24(V) DIRCM is the two-color IR 
sensor the DIRCM uses. The two-color IR sensor has shown low operational 
functionality when integrating with fast moving jets due to the system not being able to 
process the images quick enough. One-Color IR sensor processing time is lower than 
two-color due to a reduction in noise and false alarms to be filtered out. Another risk 
involved with moving forward with the DIRCM is integrating the tracking and detection 
capabilities of the system without using the current laser that is being used with it. The 
Cyclops will use a powerful laser to destroy the missile, thereby disabling it 
architecturally. This would mean the laser of the DIRCM system would have to be 
 49 
replaced and continue to work. There is also the functional risk of using the DIRCM as 
currently, the operational use of it is to disable the seeker head by jamming the IR sensor 
of the missile. The tracking and detection system would have to employ a new 
operational concept now and direct the laser to anywhere on the missile that the laser 
could structural damage the threat.     
The final system under consideration is the AN/AAR-54(V) Missile Warning 
System (MWS). This system is a fourth-generation missile warning system that is 
available for use on virtually every platform, including fast movers. The system provides 
clutter rejection, long and short-range missile detection, cueing to the countermeasure 
system, classifies the source, and can track multiple sources (Northrop Grumman 2017c). 
Similar to the DAS system, the MWS does not have much operational experience. 
However, initial tests have shown very promising results. The system also readily 
integrates with DIRCM system. Because the MWS was designed with the intention of 
being placed on fast movers, it is an ideal candidate for the Cyclops Tracking and 
Detection subsystem. 
Similar to the risk associated with the DAS with the MWS is also relatively new 
and has not been flown for an extensive amount of time when compared to DIRCM 
systems which poses a technology risk as well. The system has gone through extensive 
testing, but the lack of operational use is concerning. Another risk with the MWS is the 
UV sensors have not shown much success with fast jets thus far, especially when 
compared to the single-color IR employed by the DAS. 
3. Power Supply Subsystem 
Alternatives for the power supply system have been broken into two sections. The 
first covers airborne power generation. The second covers storage of power within the 
pod. This stored power will mainly be used to operate the pod while the onboard power 
generation system is not in use. 
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a. Ram Air Turbine/Generator (RATG) Alternatives 
Ram air turbine/generator consists of a turbine connected to an electrical 
generator to be used as a power source. Cyclops will generate its own power since the 
power generated by the aircraft is limited, and Cyclops power requirements are high. 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Ram Air Turbines are available and are 
currently being used on commercial airplanes. However, these RATs are used for 
emergency power when the aircraft loses its primary power sources. These COTS RATs 
are not capable of high enough power output to meet Cyclops electrical power 
requirements. A large RAT on a commercial aircraft could produce from five to 70 kW; 
smaller, low airspeed models may generate as little as 400 watts. The primary purpose of 
the COTS RAT is to keep the battery charged. Performance is a risk associated with 
COTS RAT. Electrical power required for the laser is too high for COTS RAT to provide 
it power directly. Therefore power must come from battery alone and once the battery has 
been depleted the system will no longer be effective (Zolidis 2002). 
ATGI designed a Hi-Powered Ram Air Turbine (HiRAT) that was awarded Phase 
III SBIR contract to be implemented in the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ). “The HiRAT 
has been successfully integrated into applications ranging from 300 watts to over 300 
kW” (Warwick 2013) and demonstrated that it can produce 90KW at the low speed, low 
altitude designed for NGJ (220 Knots and 25000 feet) (ATGI 2017).  The HiRAT can be 
designed to get high power at the operational speed and altitude to meet Cyclops 
electrical power requirements. Schedule and cost is a risk associated to HiRAT. Since the 
HiRAT has to be designed to meet our requirements; it must still go through development 
and testing to make sure it works as expected, thus increasing the possibilities of schedule 
delays and cost increase. 
COTS RAT has lower cost since HiRAT must be designed to meet our 
requirements, but the power output provided by HiRAT will allow the system to be 
powered most of the time by the RATG only using battery power when necessary. Thus 
the system will be active throughout the mission. 
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b. Battery 
Batteries will provide backup power for the laser or when the power generating 
unit is not able to produce enough power to the laser to destroy a threat; this could 
happen when operational speed and altitude changes due to incoming threats affecting the 
performance of the RATG.  
The battery selected must be able to provide power to a high energy laser: 
Energy Density (Wh/kg) is a measure of how much energy a battery can 
hold. The higher the energy density, the longer the battery can provide 
power. Power Density (W/kg) indicates how much power a battery can 
deliver on demand. Manganese and phosphate-based lithium-ion, as well 
as nickel-based chemistries, are among the best performers. (Battery 
University 2017) 
Figure 25 compares the energy density of some of the currently used Lithium ion 
technologies with lead acid, nickel-cadmium, and nickel-metal-hydride. 
 
Figure 25. Battery Energy Density Chart. Source: Battery University (2017). 
Lithium ion technology continues to grow, so a battery could be designed to have 
an energy density of approximately ten kWh to provide 300 kW power to the laser for up 
to two minutes.  Since lithium-ion batteries have higher energy, their weight will be less 
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than any other battery technology. However, lithium-ion must have battery managing 
system (BMS), which is an electronic device that manages how each cell is charged and 
discharged to protect the cells and avoid thermal runaway since lithium-ion based 
batteries are flammable. The schedule is the biggest risk associated with lithium-ion 
batteries; development and testing have to be completed incurring the risk of schedule 
delays.  
Lead acid batteries have low power density; therefore they will be heavy and big 
for the required Cyclops power. Cost is lower since they will not require electronics 
(BMS) and will not require much development. Weight and Size constraints are the 
biggest concerns with lead acid risking meeting such requirements (Battery University 
2017). 
B. SCORING STANDARDS 
There are four main categories used for scoring and comparing each system. Each 
category has a relative weight, expressed as a percentage, which was derived from 
discussions with the project stakeholders. The four categories and their relative scoring 
weights are: 
1. Aircraft Performance (10%) 
2. Cost (30%) 
3. Risk 10%) 
4. Functional Performance (50%) 
Each alternative was scored for each category, listed above. This original score is 
considered to be the “raw score.” This raw score was then divided by the maximum 
possible value to be given a “scaled score.” Thus, the scaled score was between zero and 
one. For cases where a lower scaled score was optimal, the listed scaled score was found 
by subtracting the original scaled score from one. For each alternative, the scaled scores 
were multiplied the weighted percentage for each category and then summed to provide a 
final score between zero and one.  
For example, in the first line of Table 5, the Functional Performance of the “Alt. 
#1” was given a raw score of four, out of a possible 10, as indicated in the “Maximum” 
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column which translated to a scaled score of 0.40. For Aircraft Performance, “Alt. #1” 
received a raw score of four, out of a possible five. However, since a lower value for this 
category was more desirable, for this particular example, the scaled score was 0.20, 
which is found by subtracting the raw score (4) divided by the maximum (5) from one. A 
total score of 0.75 for Alt. #1 was calculated by multiplying each scaled score by the 
relative value in the “Weight” column. This scoring process is used for each system. A 
description of each scoring category is provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
Table 5. Example Scoring Table 
 
 
1. Functional Performance (50%) 
Each system must first be evaluated based on the ability to perform the desired 
function. Since this is the actual purpose of each system, this score contributes the most 
(50%) to the overall alternative score.  
The alternative scoring is established using research and analysis of known 
systems. The system with the best score of each comparison is given a 10, and the other 
system(s) are scored relative to that. The scoring is based linearly, so a score of a five is 
considered half as good as a score of a 10. The modeling and simulation output is used to 





2. Aircraft Performance (10%) 
Aircraft performance refers to the effect that the given system will have on the 
overall performance of the aircraft. There are several categories assessed for the systems 
that can influence the aircraft performance. The scoring of these categories was 
determined using a combination of predictive research and analysis of existing systems. 
Finally, not all of the categories are relevant for comparing each specific subsystem, and 
only the relevant ones will be used during the scoring. Thus, the scoring method for 
aircraft performance varies by subsystem. 
The limitations posed to overall aircraft performance are weighted as 10% of the 
overall score for each system, indicating that it is important, but not the most important 
attribute.  
a. Weight  
Weight plays a major role in aircraft performance. Most notably, the weight will 
impact fuel efficiency and aircraft maneuverability. There are two main components that 
will determine the weight of the system - the battery, and the laser. The other components 
can be merged into “everything else.” This “everything else” is estimated to be 700 lb. 
based on analogous systems currently in use. The maximum allowable weight for the 
entire system was established to be 4100 lb. This is based on the heaviest single load 
commonly carried on an F/A-18 (a full FPU-12 480 gallon external fuel tank). 
b. Size/Shape 
The size/shape of a system will influence the aircraft performance as well. A 
physically large system will impact the ability of the aircraft to fly as desired.  
c. Limits to Flight  
If the tracking system or laser requires the aircraft to maneuver in a specific 
manner to properly function, this will also impact the aircraft performance.  
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3. Comparative Cost (30%)
Cost is always a factor during the acquisition process. Creating accurate cost 
predictions is difficult, and even more so when the program uses emerging technology. 
The department of defense has a fiscal responsibility to the tax payer, and cost must be 
considered as a large portion of the overall system rating. So, cost is evaluated as 30% of 
the overall system score.  
It can be assumed that for all of the system alternatives, the following can be 
considered the same for this research.  
• material cost (except the power supply batteries)
• operations and sustainment cost
• production and deployment cost
These are reasonable assumptions for each system given the similarity between 
materials and expected system maintenance over the life cycle.  
The main differentiator between the systems will be in the integration and testing. 
Thus, the cost will connect closely with the TRL/Risk. Integration and testing of mature 
technologies will be notably cheaper than using emerging technologies. The TRL 
specifically captures the risk of the technology, while the cost comparison takes into 
consideration the integration with the Cyclops system.  
Given the relative similarities between the existing options, it is not predicted that 
the costs of the systems will differ by any more than 10x, or “one order of magnitude,” 
between the most and least costly alternative. So, a scoring system will be used to 
compare costs where each system is scored with the following ratings: 
3 – The cheapest alternative  
2 – 5 x the cheapest alternative (1/2 an order of magnitude) 
1 – 10 x the cheapest alternative (1 order of magnitude) 
So, if one system is not reasonably expected to differ by more than one-half 
magnitude of another system, then the costs will be assumed to be the same. 
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4. Technology Risk (10%) 
There is an inherent risk in using any technology that is not currently operational. 
The consequence of building a system around an immature technology may be realized in 
increased cost (evaluated through the “cost” score), increased schedule, degraded 
performance, or a combination of all three. The technology readiness level (TRL) is used 
to compare each system. The score is a raw score from zero through nine with zero 
referring to a technology that is in the early research stage, while nine refers to 
technology that is already being used operationally for the intended purpose. These 
ratings follow the guidelines in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook. Since the Cyclops 
Pod is a next generation system using emerging technology, it is expected that some 
technologies are still immature. Thus, the technology risk is weighted only as 10% of the 
overall score. 
C. MODELING AND SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT 
The modeling and simulation research was conducted through two programs, 
High Energy Laser End to End Operational Simulation with SHaRE (HELEEOS) and 
ExtendSim.  These programs allowed a simulation of activating the various alternatives 
of Cyclops through three different environments.  Two additional programs, LEEDR and 
PITBUL, were also in review but saved for a later study.  All three of these programs are 
sensitive programs that required user agreements from the modelers and the advisors and 
were not to be shared freely.  In the end, these programs enabled a better understanding 
and evaluation of the lasers systems under review. 
HELEEOS is an Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) product that was 
shared with us by Dr. Kevin Keefer and the AFIT Center for Directed Energy (CDE). 
HELEEOS assumes that the tracking and power systems of the Cyclops perform as 
designed. The program models the laser’s given power output parameters, host aircraft 
aerial position, environmental and geographic parameters, and target missile physical and 
aerial position characteristics and determines the dwell time required for the laser to 
defeat the target missile. The measure of effectiveness (MOE) in the simulations is the 
ability of the AADL to protect the aircraft from multiple threats. The measures of 
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performance (MOPs) are the total dwell time to defeat the incoming missiles and the 
number of missiles defeated before intercepting the aircraft. 
HELEEOS is a discrete mathematical model that measures the dwell time of the 
simulated directed-energy that is delivered on a target over a broad range of 
environmental factors and scenarios.  The dwell time is the period of engagement that is 
required for the Cyclops laser to neutralize a threat.  A shorter dwell time enables an 
increase in the number of missiles that the Cyclops is capable of defeating within an 
8,000m range if all targets are fired at the same time from the same distance.  HELEEOS 
uses a time-advanced model that was set at ⅔ second for each step along with two key 
components that aided in this prediction, the stochastic component is the Laser 
Environmental Effects Definition and Reference (LEEDR) module, and the deterministic 
component is Scaling for High Energy Laser and Relay Engagements (SHaRE). 
The LEEDR component creates an environmental picture that includes sand/dust 
storms, fumes, vapor, haze, and moisture droplets.  These factors are known to affect the 
quality of a laser beam between the transmitter and the target. The SHaRE software 
enables the assessment of a HEL’s effect on target due to appropriate scaling laws, high 
energy beam characteristics, and irradiance distributions.  Inputs for HELEEOS include 
the target’s lethality, size, velocity, and position.  The strike fighter inputs include 
position, velocity, laser’s power and wavelength.  However, the platform’s optics were 
not considered for this study.  The scenario may include a plethora of information.  This 
includes the global position, atmospheric conditions, clouds/rain, ground level, and 
timeline of the various discrete events.  There was also the option of enabling an 
observer.  Jointly these components determine a HEL’s dwell time on target as well as 
various irradiance measures and other parameters. 
This simulation compares four different solid-state lasers: The Nd:YAG laser, the 
frequency doubled Nd:YAG, the Erbium fiber laser, and the Ytterbium fiber laser.  Each 
laser provides the necessary level of energy while providing different levels of power 
efficiency that leads to differing dwell times.  The simulation is conducted over four 
different scenarios: a single aircraft against multiple threats, a single threat targeting an 
allied aircraft, multiple threats targeting a formation of allied aircraft, and a multi-layered 
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air defense system targeting a formation of allied aircraft. Each laser operates within the 
bounds of each scenario in three different environments.  Pyongyang experiences long 
and cold winters with temperatures at or below freezing.  It is located near the eastern 
shore of the Yellow Sea in the valley of the Taedong River.  Mosul in the summer 
experiences hot, dry and windy weather that often results in dust storms (also called 
Haboobs).  It is a major city, located along the western bank of the Tigris River in 
northern Iraq.  Manila in the summer experiences very tropical weather.  It is one the 
oldest cities in the Philippines, located along the eastern shore of the Manila Bay at the 
mouth of the Pasig River.  Each environment involves a unique degree of turbulence, 
particulate pollution, and moisture levels.  These factors degrade the lasers ability to 
focus its beam on the target that leads to extended dwell times.  The results of the 
simulation indicate the ability of the Cyclops to reduce the susceptibility of the strike 
fighter to short-range missile threats within 8,000 m of the aircraft. ExtendSim simulates 
the process of detection, prioritization, acquisition, targeting, strike, assessment, and 
recovery for multiple MANPADS using the data derived from the HELEEOS runs.  The 
purpose of this simulation is to provide metrics with which to evaluate the various 
alternatives for optimal performance on a strike fighter aircraft. 
This simulation is intended to be a benchmark. The scenarios are designed to be 
the same for every alternative. The only part of the simulation involving probability 
distributions is the calculation of the dwell time required to kill a missile. The simulation 
begins in ExtendSim. An aircraft is simulated in flight with three missiles simulated as 
launching from ground level 10,000 m away. All three missiles have the same velocity. 
The ExtendSim model assumes that the pod will always take the same amount of time 
(two seconds) to reset and re-aim before engaging the next target. It also assumes that the 
missile tracking systems will not fail before being engaged by the Cyclops pod. The 
system immediately begins engaging the first of the missiles. The location and movement 
data are passed from ExtendSim into the HELEEOS. These parameters are then used with 
the technical characteristics of the laser alternative to determine the dwell time to destroy 
the missile in question. This dwell time data is then passed back to the ExtendSim model 
to determine the new location and movement information for the missiles and aircraft. 
 59 
The second missile is then engaged, the new location and movement data passed to 
HELEEOS, and the process repeated. The simulation continues with this process until all 
missiles are destroyed, or the aircraft is intercepted. The performance of these systems is 
based on whether they were able to shoot down all three missiles and how much total 
dwell time was required to defeat all missiles. Figure 26 shows this process. The source 
model used for the ExtendSim portion of the simulation is shown in Appendix B. 
 
Figure 26. Functional Performance Simulation Flowchart 
The results of the HELEEOS simulation give the dwell time of the Cyclops over 
various horizontal and vertical distances.  The laser was supplied with 300kW of electric 
power and used a 0.33 m exit aperture diameter.  The strike fighter flew at 10,000 m. 
This value was based on performance data from ATGI (ATGI 2017).  The Cyclops 
required two seconds between engagements to perform process actions, used a Gaussian 
shaped far-field beam with a normal effect distribution. This value was based on the 
performance of the Guardian countermeasures system, which is an adaptation of DIRCM 
technology (Northrop Grumman 2017d). The missile was simulated with a round 
geometry, 0.05m diameter, and effect threshold of 10kJ/cm2 (Carter 1984, 17). 
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Table 6 shows the results of the simulations. It shows the average total laser dwell 
time to neutralize three missiles for each of the laser alternatives across each of the 
environments. 
 
Table 6. Average Laser Alternative Dwell Times (Sec) 
 
 
One aspect of these results that stands out is the apparent inconsistency of the 
effect of environment on laser alternative. The Nd:YAG laser performs better in Mosul 
than it does in Manila, yet the FdYAG performs better in Manila than Mosul. The key to 
these differences lies in the wavelength of the light being projected. Different types of 
particulates in the air absorb different amounts of energy from the light that passes 
through them. The portion of energy absorbed when the light passes through these 
particulates is dependent in large part on the wavelength. In a sense, the particulates in 
the air are more opaque to certain wavelengths than to others. Figure 27 shows the 
absorption spectra for water (Prahl 1998). Lower absorption indicates less energy 
removed by passing through the particulate. 
YAG FdYAG Ytterbium Erbium
Pyongyang 0.567 0.271 0.385 0.464
Mosul 1.306 1.204 0.873 0.958
Manila 1.786 0.496 0.861 1.346
Average 1.220 0.657 0.707 0.923
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Figure 27. Water Absorption Spectrum. Adapted from Prahl (1998). 
The reason the FdYAG alternative performs so well in Manila is that, with a 
wavelength of 532 nm, the absorption is extremely low. For this type of laser, the water 
in the air is almost transparent. Although the Ytterbium and Nd:YAG lasers have very 
similar wavelengths (1055 and 1064 nm, respectively), the increased efficiency of the 
Ytterbium allows for reduced dwell times. The Erbium, with the highest wavelength 
(1550 nm), also has the highest absorption. 
The main environmental factor affecting laser performance in Mosul is the dust in 
the air. The absorption spectrum for dust is significantly different from water. The 
absorption coefficients vary based on the composition of the particulates in the air. 
However, there does seem to be an overall pattern to dust absorption spectra. At the 
lowest wavelengths, the absorption is high. It trends downward as the wavelength 
increases. At around 1,000 nm, the absorption begins increasing again before continuing 
to drop around 1,500 nm. With a wavelength of 532 nm, this explains the increase in 
dwell times in Mosul for the FdYAG. Similarly, this increase in absorption at   or greater 





D. SCORING AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
This section details the results of the alternative scoring using the analytical 
methods laid out in Sections B and C. Using these methods, the best alternatives from 
Section A are identified. These conclusions will then be used in Chapter V to establish 
recommendations. 
1. Laser Subsystem 
The laser system alternatives were evaluated and scored on the four different 
categories. The results of the scoring can be seen in Table 7. The Ytterbium laser 
received the highest score of 0.73 (out of a possible 1.0). The relatively poor simulation 
results of the Nd:YAG (standard) and the Erbium, significantly hurt their overall score 
(0.64 and 0.68, respectively). While the Nd:YAG (double frequency) performed well in 
the simulation, the poor cost and large technology risk ultimately contributed to the lower 
score of 0.64. 
 




Section C discusses the M&S methods used to evaluate the laser type alternatives. 
The results from this simulation were averaged for each laser at each location, producing 
an average total dwell time, seen Table 8. This average score (raw score) was then 
divided by the maximum allowable score of 2 seconds, to produce the scaled core in 
Table 7, above. Since a higher average time indicates a poorer laser performance, this 
value was subtracted from 1 during to calculate the total score for each alternative. 
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Table 8. Average Laser Dwell Times 
 
 
b. Comparative Cost 
The fiber lasers have been used for ship based operations. Meanwhile, the other 
laser types have not been used for any operations at the required power output of the 
Cyclops pod. It is reasonable to believe that the integration costs of the Nd:YAG lasers 
will be notably larger than that of the fiber lasers. Thus, the fiber lasers receive a scaled 
score of three, while the other lasers receive a score of two.  
c. Aircraft Performance 
This was determined solely as a function of weight. The weight was calculated 
using the expected size of the laser, given the necessary power output. The weight was 
calculated in pounds and then divided by the overall allowable weight of the pod, 2,900 
pounds.  Since a higher weight negatively affects the aircraft performance, this value was 
subtracted from 1 during to calculate the scaled score for each alternative. 
d. Technology risk 
The fiber lasers have been used on ship based operations for the United States 
Navy. There is a substantial difference between the ship based operations when compared 
to the air operations of the F/A-18. Namely, the limited size and weight restrictions when 
carried on an aircraft versus a large ship. Thus, the fiber lasers receive a TRL score of  
six, for the raw score. Meanwhile, the Nd:YAG lasers have not been used in an operation 
the size of the Cyclops pod. While the theoretical usage has been proven, there have not 
been any real tests as a laser of this size. Thus, the Nd:YAG lasers receive a TRL of 4. 
Average Dwell Time 
(sec)
Nd:YAG 1.21982




2. Tracking Subsystem 
The final scoring of the tracking system alternatives, discussed in Section A, can 
be found in Table 9. The DAS system received the highest comparative score, 0.99, out 
of 1.0. The other systems received a 0.88 (MWS) and 0.85 (DIRCM). Overall, the high 
technology readiness, low expected cost, and superior performance of the DAS set it 
apart from the other systems. 
 




All tracking system alternatives will perform well in the expected environments. 
Each system is a proven tracking system capable of tracking the desired targets. As such, 
each system received the maximum raw score of 10. 
b. Comparative Cost 
The DAS was designed for use on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to the similar 
flight profile of the Cyclops mission. So, the system is already designed meeting the 
complicated requirement of integration with a high-performance aircraft environment. 
The other systems use technologies that are not suited for the intended operational 
envelope of the Cyclops pod, so it is reasonable to assume that their integration efforts 
will cost notably more.  
The DAS receives a raw score of three, while the other two systems receive a 














Functional Performance 0.5 10 10 1.00 10 1.00 10 1.00
Comparative Cost 0.3 3 3 1.00 2 0.67 2 0.67
Aircraft Performance 0.1 10 10 1.00 5 0.50 5 0.50
Technology Risk 0.1 9 8 0.89 9 1.00 7 0.78
Total 1.00 0.99 0.85 0.83
Tracking & Detection
 65 
c. Aircraft Performance 
The functionality of the DIRCM & MWS systems degrade significantly with fast-
moving and high-maneuvering aircraft, as discussed in Section A. DAS, meanwhile, is 
designed to work with high-speed aircraft, so it receives a score of 10. The DIRCM and 
MWS both receive a raw score of five. This score of 5 highlights the effect of the mission 
impact of the F/A-18 by limiting the flight to the subsonic regime with limited 
maneuverability. 
d. Technology Risk 
The DIRCM is a proven system, in existence and operation for several decades. 
Thus, the tracking system receives a TRL score of nine, for the raw score.  
The MWS has not been used solely in a mission environment, though operational 
testing has proven the system’s performance within the limited operational environment. 
The MWS receives a TRL score of seven.  
The DAS has demonstrated its functionality throughout F-35 testing through IOC. 
However, the newness of the system limits the TRL rating of an eight. 
3. Power Supply Subsystem 
The power system alternatives were scored for both the Battery and the RAT, 
with the specific alternatives discussed in Section A. The results of the analysis are seen 
in Tables 10 and 11. For the RAT, the ATGI system received a higher rating (0.77) than 
the generic COTS (0.70), largely due to its superior performance. Also, the Li-ion battery 
(0.84) received a higher rating compared to the lead-acid batteries (0.75) because of its 
higher predicted performance. 
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Table 10. Power Supply Subsystem Alternative Scoring (RAT) 
 
 





As discussed in Section A, the COTS will perform significantly worse than the 
ATGI RAT, forcing the system to use battery power as the primary power for the laser. 
Since the main purpose of the RAT is to supply power, the COTS receives a notably 
lower raw score (4/10) than the ATGI (10/10).  
Batteries 
The expected performance of the Li-ion will exceed that of the lead-acid batteries. 
While both may be able to provide the necessary power, the Li-ion batteries will provide 
the power in a more efficient and reliable method. The cells of the lead-acid batteries will 
fail more often, leading to a significant decrease in the performance expectation. So, the 
Li-ion battery receives a raw score of 10, while the lead-acid battery receives an eight.  
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b. Comparative Cost 
RAT 
The main benefit of the COTS product is that it will be cheap since a system can 
be selected that is already proven and integrated with an aircraft. The ATGI, meanwhile, 
is a new technology with unknown integration costs. The COTS receives a raw score of 
3, while the ATGI receives a one, representing the 10x difference between the two 
systems.  
Batteries 
The upfront integration costs of the lead-acid will be much cheaper than the Li-
ion batteries. The Li-ion batteries, with the expected power output, are a newer 
technology that has not been developed for use on a system the size of the Cyclops pod. 
This will lead to a greater integration effort and cost to ensure that the proper power 
output can be provided within the Cyclops pod. This difference leads to a raw score of 
three for the lead-acid battery and a two for the Li-ion battery.  
c. Aircraft Performance  
RAT 
There is no appreciable difference in the effect on aircraft performance between 
each RAT, so they are rated the same 
Batteries 
Aircraft performance was determined solely as a function of weight. The Wh/kg 
of each battery type was estimated as 110 Wh/kg for lead-acid batteries and 40 Wh/kg for 
Li-ion batteries. This weight was calculated in pounds and then divided by the overall 
allowable weight of 2900 pounds, discussed in Section B.  Since a higher weight 
negatively affects the aircraft performance, this value was subtracted from one to produce 




d. Technology Risk 
RAT 
Similar to the aircraft performance, the COTS product receives a raw score of 9 
due to its use in current mission environments. Meanwhile, prototype HiRATs have been 
used in relevant environments, earning a TRL score of six.  
Battery 
The Li-ion batteries are still early in the developmental process for this type of 
system. While laboratory and analysis tests have provided positive results, the system has 
not matured beyond a TRL of four, for the raw score. While Lead-acid batteries are a 
more understood system, they also have not been used to this kind of scale as the Cyclops 
Pod in an operational environment. So, the lead-acid batteries receive a TRL score of six. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In many ways, this chapter served as the culmination of the work of the previous 
sections. The first three chapters were devoted to creating the conceptual framework for 
the Cyclops pod. This conceptual design process is especially important for a relatively 
unprecedented project such as this. The requirements and architecture drove the selection 
of technology alternatives. Similarly, the CONOPS and requirements drove the scoring 
metrics and design of the simulation. 
This chapter proved that existing and near-future technology can meet the 
requirements of this project. It also clearly showed the important benefits and drawbacks 
of the technology alternatives. Chapter V will conclude this report. It uses the scores 




This chapter is the final chapter of the report. It is a collection of 
recommendations both for topics covered in this paper and for further development of the 
project. Using the research and analysis from Chapters I–IV, the optimal alternatives are 
identified. Recommendations for future work on the project have also been created using 
this information and the experience of creating this report. These recommendations are 
intended not only to alleviate some of the most significant constraints on this report but 
also to continue to develop this project down avenues of research unavailable for this 
report. 
A. ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section uses the scoring results of Chapter IV as well as additional research 
into the technologies to determine the technologies best suited for use in the Cyclops pod. 
These recommendations are based on analysis of the alternatives separate for each 
system. Due to the immature nature of the technology and the unprecedented design of 
the Cyclops system, predicting integration problems between subsystems was considered 
outside the scope for this report. 
1. Laser Subsystem 
Ultimately, two lasers remained worthy of consideration after simulation. The 
frequency doubled Nd:YAG (average dwell time 0.66 seconds) laser is the best overall 
performer, and the Ytterbium laser is second (average dwell time 0.71 seconds) but with 
a more mature design. As both lasers meet the dwell time performance requirement, the 
advantage is given to the Ytterbium laser. The more mature technology allows for a 
lower anticipated cost and risk and shorter development cycle. The expected result is a 
more cost-effective acquisition process and a more rapid fielding schedule for the fleet. 
2. Tracking Subsystem 
Among all these technologies there are a few things that distinguish one from the 
rest. First, while the DIRCM system is extremely well tested, it has integration issues 
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with fast jets due to the two-color IR sensor and was not designed to integrate with them 
as it does not currently have a light enough design and powerful enough laser to be 
operational effective for the F/A-18. The MWS system was designed to work with fast 
movers and integrate with whatever subsystems they employ. However, when compared 
to the other two suggested technologies, it is the least tested. This is especially alarming 
as it employs a UV sensor system, which has had difficulty integrating with fast jets in 
the past. The DAS system was designed to work with fast movers and was specifically 
designed for the F-35; therefore, it is already operational. Finally, the single-color IR 
sensor processing speed has proven itself on fast jets and therefore stands as the best 
choice for the tracking and detection system for the Cyclops. 
3. Power Supply Subsystem 
The Cyclops pod must generate its own power due to lack of available power 
from the aircraft; therefore, the Power supply has high power requirements for the 
effectiveness of the laser. It is also important that the system maintains active during 
missions; for that reason, we are going to concentrate the power supply recommendations 
to the Ram Air Turbine (RAT) and the battery. The purpose of the RAT is to provide 
enough power to the pod during flight and provide high power to the laser during 
operational conditions (speed and altitude). The purpose of the high power battery is to 
provide power to the laser when flying conditions do not allow the RAT to generate 
enough power.  
To meet power requirement, we recommend the use of HiRAT. This type of 
generation unit has been used in the development of the Next Generation Jammer, and its 
innovative design allows producing high power at the expected operational speeds and 
altitudes. We believe that this technology can be used to develop an effective Power 
Generation Unit capable of supplying power to the pod and laser during incoming threats. 
As discussed throughout this paper, backup power is necessary to keep the 
Cyclops system active; therefore, we recommend the use of high powered batteries. 
Lithium Ion batteries are currently the leading technology in high power and energy 
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density. We also have to consider the weight and size constraints, so the use of this 
technology is highly recommended. 
4. Optimal Configuration Physical Characteristics 
Table 12 shows a weight estimate of this recommended system. Due to the lack of 
information on some aspects of the pod, weights of analogous components were used. 
Specifically, the skin and structure of the pod were approximated by the weight of an 
FPU-12 external fuel tank. The mission computer was approximated by a similar 
subsystem on the ATFLIR pod known as the Pod Electronics Housing. Finally, the 
weight of the DAS was approximated by the Pointer/Tracker Assembly of the DIRCM 
system. Due to the HiRAT’s early stage in development, it is difficult to estimate its 
weight. Instead, the HiRAT is assumed to make up the same proportion of weight for the 
AADL as it does for the ALQ-99 jamming pod. The weight of the entire ALQ-99 is 1000 
lb. (Walker 1990). The weight of the RAT powering it is 160 lb. (NSN Central 2017). 
Based on this, the HiRAT is expected to make up 16% of the total weight of the AADL. 
All told, the recommended system weighed in at 3500 lb. This was less than the 4100 lb. 
weight of the full FPU-12 external fuel tank. 
 
Table 12. Recommended System Weight 
 
 
Figure 28 shows a notional 3D model of the AADL. Included in the diagram are 
outlines indicating areas for certain subcomponents. The dimensions for these 
components are based on analogous, existing components where available. The large 
diameter of the pod is driven by the Ytterbium laser. That dimension of the pod is based 










2015). The volume of the batteries is based on the need to deliver 300 kW of power. At 
5.8 kW/l, approximately 3,100 cubic inches are required (A123 Systems 2017). DAS is 
not taken into account in this figure since it sensors are distributed around the aircraft. 
The model is notional and shows the general shape and placement of the various 
components. 
 
Figure 28. AADL 3D Model Subcomponent Breakdown 
B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
The largest constraint on this report has been the lack of available information on 
the technology critical to the report. This lack of information was due to either the 
immature nature of the technology or the classification of the information. 
Due to the shortage in applicable performance research on much of the 
technology in the report, the next step of the project development is to begin creating that 
research. Limitations on budget, facilities, and timeline of this report prevented any sort 
of testing to supplement the information from the literature review. Almost all laser 
performance data was based on laser performance tests done in laboratory conditions for 
civilian uses. Testing under more realistic could verify the laboratory results as well as 
identify potential concerns that would not show up in an academic setting. In addition, 
integration issues between subsystems were not considered for this report due to the lack 
of available information on hardware and software interaction on the relevant systems. 
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When the physical performance testing takes place, early interface testing should begin as 
well. While this will not replace the more in-depth testing later in development, it will 
provide an early idea on further concerns to be overcome before project completion. 
The next phase of the project development should also be classified. Much of the 
performance specifications for the tracking subsystem and existing countermeasures 
systems are classified. The decision was made to maintain this report as unclassified was 
made to keep sharing and communication between team members as easy as possible. 
Unfortunately, this decision forced the scoring of the alternatives to be relatively high 
level, especially the tracking subsystem. By making the next phase classified, a much 
more detailed analysis will be possible. 
Lastly, while the benchmark-style simulations used for scoring are adequate for 
the purposes of this report, a more realistic combat scenario simulation should be 
developed and tested. This simulation should simulate performance in a 3D environment 
and model an aircraft’s flight path on a combat mission with randomized encounters with 
incoming missiles at different ranges.  
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APPENDIX  A. REQUIREMENTS 
Table 13. Detailed Requirements 
Number Requirements 
0.0 Protect F/A-18 from incoming missiles 
1 Communicate with friendly forces 
1.1 Communicate to the aircraft information concerning incoming threats 
1.1.1     Alert pilot to missile threat 
1.1.1.1         Send threat data to ground control 
1.1.1.2         Alert pilot when missile threat(s) are defeated 
1.1.1.3         Pass defeated missile data to aircraft mission computer 
1.1.1.4         Validate true threats to reduce false alarms 
1.1.1.5         Alert pilot to incoming threat with low likelihood of interception 
1.2 Communicate status of Cyclops systems 
1.2.1     Be able to communicate with all systems within the pod 
1.2.2     Communicate status to aircraft 
2 Defeat incoming missile before damaging the aircraft 
2.1 Defeat incoming missile at 4.5 mile range 
2.2 Capable of defeating incoming missiles within three seconds 
2.3 Capable of engaging missiles within 90° arc around aircraft 
2.3.1     Capable of engaging missiles within a 90° arc below the 
    aircraft 
3 Be capable of powering all systems simultaneously 
3.1 Be capable of completely powering the pod 
3.1.1     Provide electrical power to all Cyclops systems  
3.1.1.1         Convert and regulate supplied power to be used by all systems 
3.1.1.2         Be able to store generated power to be used by all systems 
3.1.2     Distribute electrical power to all Cyclops systems  
3.2 Capable of spending prolonged periods in an active status 
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4 Track and target incoming missiles 
4.1 Track threats posed by multiple incoming missiles 
4.1.1     Detect missile threats 
4.1.2     Capable of tracking multiple incoming missile threats 
    simultaneously 
4.1.3     Track missiles within effective range 
4.1.4     Track missiles regardless of seeker type 
4.2 Tracking system shall prioritize threat missiles 
4.2.1     Tracking system shall identify highest threat missiles 
4.2.2     Capable of queueing additional lower priority threats 
4.3 Detect and track missiles during aircraft maneuvers 
4.4 Track missile over a 90° arc 




APPENDIX  B. EXTENDSIM SIMULATION MODEL 
 
Figure 29. ExtendSim Performance Simulation Model 
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